From: John Lepingwell I received a few expressions of interest in my KAL article, and I have received approval from the copyright holders for posting it on the sci.military newsgroup. I believe it is appropriate for this group, for while it is not completely technical, it does try to untangle the story as much as is possible. The second part, on the implications for theories as to why KAL was in Soviet airspace, is more controversial. While this may venture slightly out of sci.military's bounds I hope it does not do so too much. [I'll go with it since its very thorough and well documented, and it provides insight into Soviet air defense. --CDR] NEW SOVIET REVELATIONS ABOUT THE KAL-007 SHOOTDOWN John W.R. Lepingwell Department of Political Science University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 361 Lincoln Hall 702 S. Wright St Urbana, IL 61801 Copyright 1991 RFE/RL Inc. [AUTHOR'S NOTE AND DISCLAIMER: This is a preliminary draft of an article published in "Report on the USSR" by the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute. Any citations should be made to the final, published work, which appeared in "Report on the USSR" Vol. 3, Number 17 (April 26, 1991). This article is provided for the information of Internet and Usenet users who may not have ready access to "Report on the USSR." It is copyright 1991 by RFE/RL Inc, and this posting is not to be considered a repudiation of copyright rights. "Report on the USSR" is a weekly publication of the RFE/RL Research Institute that provides timely analysis of current affairs in the Soviet Union. It is only available by subscription. For information write to RFE/RL Inc, 1775 Broadway, New York, NY 10019. My disclaimer: I am an occasional contributer to "Report on the USSR" and a frequent reader of it. I do not, however, work for Radio Liberty or the U.S. Government. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and do not reflect the views of RFE/RL Inc. or the U.S. government. N.B. This article was written in March 1991. There were no major developments between March and late May 1991 (the date of posting) that would lead me to reconsider the main arguments in the article. Unfortunately, Gorbachev did not address the issue in any detail during his trip to S. Korean in mid-April.] Despite the recent rollback in glasnost', the Soviet newspaper Izvestiya has published a remarkable series of articles on the shootdown of Korean Air Lines flight 007 in September 1983.1 The revelations in the series shed light on one of the most critical events in U.S.-Soviet relations of the past decade and resolve a number of questions concerning the shootdown. In general, the new Soviet reports tend to strengthen the argument that KAL-007 strayed accidentally into Soviet airspace, while weakening the claims that it was a deliberate intrusion. Background: Events and Interpretations There is little disagreement about the basic facts of the KAL tragedy. On September 1, 1983, a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 deviated from its planned flightpath from Anchorage to Seoul by hundreds of miles, flying over the Kamchatka peninsula and then Sakhalin Island.2 Soviet air defenses tracked KAL-007 over Kamchatka, finally intercepting it over Sakhalin Island, where it was shot down by a Soviet Su-15 interceptor just before exiting Soviet airspace. Interpretations of the facts vary widely. The U.S. government maintained that KAL-007 had inadvertently strayed from its flightpath, that the Soviets had intercepted and identified the aircraft as a civilian airliner, and destroyed it nonetheless. According to the U.S., the aircraft was not on an intelligence mission, and was not coordinated with other U.S. operations in the area that night.3 President Reagan called the shootdown a "barbaric act" and imposed limited sanctions on the Soviet Union.4 Several years later, however, the Reagan administration quietly backed away from its initial assertion that the Soviets had positively identified the aircraft as a civilian airliner, and admitted that the Soviets might have believed it was a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft.5 The Soviet interpretation of the shootdown was very different. It emerged slowly, over a few days, but eventually stabilized into a detailed theory that laid the blame for the tragedy squarely on the United States. Soviet officials charged that the airliner was part of a deliberate "provocation" by the U.S. and South Korea, intended to force the Soviets to reveal valuable information about their Far Eastern defenses, and to provoke a new round in the cold war. According to this view, KAL-007 deliberately left its assigned flightpath, and in collaboration with a nearby U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft proceeded to penetrate Soviet airspace. Responding to this intrusion, the Soviet Air Defense Forces (Voyska protivovozdushnoy oborony--VPVO) activated their entire radar and communications network, allowing the U.S. to gain valuable intelligence.6 A key component of the Soviet argument was that KAL-007 tried to evade Soviet air defenses, both by changing its flightpath to avoid surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, and by taking evasive action when a Soviet interceptor tried to force the airliner to land. The standard Soviet account claimed that the aircraft was flying "blacked out" without its normal air navigation lights, that it was warned with tracer fire from the Soviet interceptor, and that it was repeatedly hailed (with no response) on the international emergency radio frequency. When the aircraft allegedly ignored the warnings and took evasive action, the Soviets decided to destroy it. According to the Soviet view, the KAL incident was provoked by the U.S., and particularly the CIA, and the U.S. should bear the responsibility for the deaths of the 269 people on board. Prompted by the apparent inconsistencies and unresolved questions in official versions of the event, several authors have published lengthy studies of the KAL-007 tragedy. Some of these studies have expounded theories suggesting that the KAL flight was the result of a conspiracy, rather than an accident or error.7 The evidence uncovered by the Izvestiya investigation undermines a number of previous Soviet assertions, and weakens the conspiracy theories. Among the revelations are the following: 1) KAL-007's air navigation lights were on throughout the interception. 2) The interceptor pilot did not fire tracer rounds to alert the KAL airliner, because his aircraft was armed with only armor-piercing rounds. 3) The Soviets did locate the wreckage of the airliner, and mounted a campaign to keep U.S. forces away from the area. 4) The "black boxes" containing cockpit voice recordings and flight data were found, and reportedly sent to Moscow for analysis. This information tends to confirm the argument that the KAL-007 crew was unaware of the interception attempt. The implications of these revelations for a more complete and accurate understanding of the KAL tragedy are examined below. The Intercept and Shootdown It is often forgotten that the KAL-007 incident was the tragic culmination of a number of interceptions of unidentified aircraft in Soviet airspace. In earlier interceptions the standard rules of engagement were clear: intruders must be forced to land, or destroyed. In some instances these rules led to attacks on civilian aircraft as well as military aircraft that strayed into Soviet airspace.8 That this policy was a reaction to U.S. U-2 overflights in the 1950s is likely, but the fact that the policy remained in force until the late 1970s or early 1980s signals a preoccupation with security and defense of Soviet borders that seems far out of proportion to the threat posed by one aircraft. The background to the shootdown, then, is one of Soviet determination to prevent any incursion into Soviet airspace, combined with longstanding U.S. and NATO attempts to probe Soviet air defenses in an attempt to gain intelligence information.9 Most of the revelations come from an Izvestiya interview with Gennadiy Nikolayevich Osipovich, the pilot of the Su-15 that shot down KAL-007.10 Osipovich confirms Hersh's assertion that VPVO forces in the Far East Military District were on high alert during the summer of 1983 due to an April 1983 overflight of Zelenyy Island by U.S. aircraft.11 After the intrusion, VPVO units were criticized for their laxity, further increasing tension. But despite this criticism, and the possibility of further air activity near the Kuriles, Soviet interceptor pilots were not provided with sufficient fuel to allow them to conduct air combat in the region, and return home. Their commanders were reportedly concerned that a full fuel load would allow pilots to reach Japan, raising the possibility of defection.12 Soviet pilots were warned that after air combat, they would be directed to a land area over which they could eject. This high alert level continued through the summer, but by late August the tension had diminished. Nevertheless, the pressure on the VPVO to react decisively against any intruder was very great. The restriction on aircraft range severely hampered Soviet interceptor operations against the KAL-007 flight. The initial Soviet interception of KAL-007 over the Kamchatka peninsula was broken off because the interceptor did not have sufficient fuel to follow the aircraft.13 But Soviet air defenses in the area were put on high alert levels, and remained on alert as KAL-007 left Soviet airspace over Kamchatka, and continued on a course for Sakhalin Island. Lieutenant Colonel Osipovich was the most experienced pilot on alert duty that night, and was ordered to his aircraft at 4:30 am local time, although he did not take off until approximately 6:00 am.14 This long time lag implies that Osipovich was alerted while KAL-007 was still over Kamchatka.15 In his interview, Osipovich noted that he was surprised to be alerted at that time of day, since RC-135 missions usually occurred after 11:00 am. Osipovich was presumably referring to the Rivet Joint RC-135 electronic intelligence missions, which were normally, but not always, conducted during daytime.16 The timing of the alert would therefore have been unusual, but not unprecedented. Nevertheless, it might have raised some questions not only amongst the pilots but the ground controllers and commanders as well. Osipovich's account of what happened that morning differs significantly from the Soviet reports of the time. Indeed, Osipovich was shown the transcript made by the U.S. of Soviet air to ground communications during the interception, and he confirmed their general accuracy.17 Soviet transcripts were reportedly "doctored" to conform with the official story, even though they were never released.18 In interviews immediately after the shootdown, Osipovich was told what to say, in order to bolster the Soviet case.19 In his interview with Izvestiya, Osipovich confirms that when he sighted the aircraft its air navigation lights were on, as alleged by the U.S. in its interpretation of the transcript. At Osipovich's range from KAL-007, the aircraft only appeared 2-3 centimeters across. In the dark this would have made visual identification extremely difficult. After making the intercept, KAL-007 and the interceptor entered a region where there was no ground-based radar coverage.20 This blind spot may have delayed the intercept, and perhaps forced the endgame to proceed at a more rapid pace. As KAL-007 crossed into Soviet airspace, and before any serious attempt to identify it had been made, Osipovich was ordered to destroy it. But before he could carry out the order, it was rescinded.21 Instead, Osipovich was ordered to force the aircraft to land. Here, the divergence from the old Soviet story are striking. According to previous Soviet accounts, the Su-15 interceptor fired tracer rounds and tried to contact KAL-007 on the international emergency frequency.22 As Osipovich admits in his interview, he did neither. His aircraft was not armed with tracer rounds, but only armor-piercing shells that could not be observed. Nor did he try radio contact on the emergency frequency, because there was no time to do so, and he would have had to break off contact with his ground controller in order to tune to the emergency frequency.23 Osipovich maintains that the KAL-007 crew saw his "flashing" but it is unclear from the interview whether Osipovich flashed his landing lights or simply was referring to his standard strobe and navigation lights. To see the Su-15's lights would have been difficult, since the interceptor was apparently below the aircraft at the time.24 Osipovich's reason for asserting that the KAL crew saw his interceptor is that KAL-007 allegedly took evasive action, gaining altitude and slowing as it did so. This is a weak argument. First, it is unlikely that a 747 pilot would consider it possible to evade a highly maneuverable interceptor. Second, if the KAL pilot was attempting evasive action, his actions were quite mild. Osipovich makes no suggestion that the pilot engaged in more extreme maneuvers, other than a gradual climb of a few thousand feet. Presumably, a pilot concerned that he was under attack would "jink" and change course and altitude more dramatically. Third, the ascent to higher altitude appears to have been a fuel economy maneuver, and the copilot calmly reported the altitude change to Japanese air traffic control.25 In retrospect, it appears that Osipovich may have been "rationalizing" the aircraft's actions, reading intentionality into an action that may have been completely unrelated to the attempts at interception. Nevertheless, Osipovich became convinced, and remains convinced, that the KAL crew was trying to escape him. At no time during the interception did Osipovich identify the aircraft as a civilian airliner. He apparently was never closer than 2 kilometers to KAL-007, and claims not to have been familiar with the silouhette of the 747. Osipovich recalls that only after firing two air to air missiles did he begin to wonder what kind of aircraft it was, for it seemed larger than an Ilyushin-76 (a large Soviet transport aircraft), and roughly resembled a Soviet Tu-16 bomber. An indicator of Osipovich's concern (if not confusion) is that his first question for his commander upon returning to base was whether he had downed a Soviet aircraft.26 Osipovich confirms that the two missiles hit the aircraft on the left wing and rear fuselage. KAL-007 immediately began to lose altitude, and there seems to have been some confusion amongst the decisionmakers on the ground as to what was happening. Soviet ground controllers apparently ordered the MiG following Osipovich's aircraft to try and track KAL-007 on the way down, but the MiG pilot was unable to make visual contact.27 The account of the interception thus matches that provided by the U.S. in many ways. The interception was clearly hurried, with the ground controllers uncertain as to what they were trying to intercept. The attempts to contact the crew of KAL-007 were performed hastily, and without much concern for their effectiveness. There is no evidence that Osipovich identified the "target" as a civilian aircraft. Hersh maintains that in 1983 the Soviets violated their own rules of engagement, requiring a positive identification of the aircraft before attack.28 Indeed, even had Osipovich identified the aircraft as civilian it is not certain that the Soviet response would have been any different. In 1978 a KAL airliner had been clearly identified as civilian, yet the pilot was ordered to destroy the aircraft.29 Similarly, in the aftermath of the Rust affair, the tone of the articles implied that the VPVO's main error had been in not stopping the intrusion.30 After the Shootdown: The Search for the Black Boxes In the wake of the tragedy, both the U.S. and Soviet Union mounted massive search operations in the Sea of Japan. The Izvestiya series discusses Soviet efforts to find the wreckage in some detail. The account states that the Soviet Navy did not have sufficient equipment and trained personnel, and had to rely on a ship, divers, and diving equipment assigned to the task by the Ministry of the Gas Industry.31 Soviet forces did their best to hamper U.S. and Japanese efforts to locate and retrieve the black boxes. According to the account, the Soviet Navy placed a false black box with a "pinger" in a deep part of the sea (620 meters), to divert the U.S. search effort. This may have triggered a mistaken U.S. assertion that the black boxes had been located, an assertion that was later dropped.32 Soviet forces did finally locate the wreckage 11 miles off Moneron Island at a depth of 160 meters, sometime in late September or early October.33 A special drilling ship, able to stabilize its position above the wreckage, was brought in to support the diving and retrieval operations. For almost a month divers searched the area for parts of the aircraft and the black boxes.34 According to Izvestiya's interviews with the diving team, little was left of the aircraft, which apparently broke up upon hitting the water's surface. The largest pieces found were only about a meter in size. The divers were also surprised to find few human remains, discovering instead primarily clothes and personal effects. As the articles speculate, the decomposition of the bodies apparently was very rapid, leaving little for the divers to find.35 No evidence of espionage equipment was found amongst the wreckage. In addition to the diving team borrowed from the Ministry of the Gas Industry, a submersible from the Academy of Sciences was brought to the scene. It was this submersible that allegedly recovered one of the two black boxes found by the Soviets.36 The black boxes were reportedly sent to the mainland, and thence to Moscow for analysis.37 The retrieval of the black boxes was a closely held secret and the results of the analysis have never been revealed. The reluctance of the Soviets to announce their retrieval of the black boxes raises questions as to their contents. The black boxes would contain cockpit voice recordings and other data that are critically important to understanding the last moments of KAL-007 and how it came to be over Sakhalin. Implications and Explanations The case of KAL-007 has been debated in a highly charged atmosphere. The string of errors and coincidences that might have led the aircraft to its destruction appears incredible, and many authors have therefore concluded that KAL-007's flight was not accidental. But evidence for the KAL-007 flight being a planned intrusion into Soviet airspace is dubious at best, and many of the arguments that it was intentional are based on weak suppositions.38 How do the new Soviet revelations affect the balance of evidence between accident and premeditation? While there is little new material on the origins of KAL-007, the account of the interception and the recovery operation contradicts some portions of the conspiracy theories. Both Pearson and Johnson find fault with U.S. reports of the interception, reinterpreting the transcripts and arguing that the Soviet pilot had indeed attempted to communicate with KAL-007 by the emergency radio channel, firing tracers, and possibly blinking his lights. Furthermore, they question the U.S. assertion that KAL-007's navigation lights were on.39 According to the conspiracy theories, the failure of the KAL-007 crew to respond to Soviet attempts to communicate strongly supports the hypothesis that they were on a spy mission, and tried to evade the Su-15.40 Indeed, they suggest that Soviet radars were being jammed by U.S. electronic warfare assets, with Johnson explicitly pointing to the "blind zone" that the Su-15 entered, and that this jamming caused one of the two missiles launched (a radar-guided missile) to miss KAL-007.41 These assertions are falsified by the new Soviet information. KAL- 007's lights were on, the Su-15 fired cannon shells that could not have been seen by the crew of KAL-007, and the pilot made no attempt to contact the aircraft on the emergency radio frequency. There is no evidence in the interview with Osipovich of jamming or interference with the Soviet intercept operation. The "blind spot" in radar coverage was apparently a previously existing weak link in the Soviet air defenses about which the pilots had never been informed. Osipovich also confirms that both missiles hit the aircraft, causing extensive damage. The new account of the recovery operation also punctures some of the assumptions of the conspiracy theorists. Early reports indicated that the U.S. may have detected a black box "pinger" in mid-September, but the reports soon disappeared. These reports have led to allegations that the U.S. found the black boxes and covered up the retrieval operation in order to suppress evidence implicating U.S. intelligence services.42 The information that the wreckage and black boxes were found in Soviet waters explains the failure of U.S. recovery efforts, and the decoy black box planted by the Soviets apparently triggered the mistaken U.S. claims. Furthermore, it is quite likely that U.S. intelligence was aware of the arrival and positioning of the Soviet drilling ship, and may have recognized that the Soviets had located the wreckage and black boxes. This, in turn, may have led to the U.S. decision to call off further searches in November 1983. These new revelations, and confirmations of old data, seriously weaken some of the conspiracy theory arguments, even if they do not constitute a complete refutation.43 The key question, how KAL-007 went off course, cannot be satisfactorily resolved without access to the black box information that the Soviet Ministry of Defense may hold.44 The evidence does clearly show that the Soviets were confused about the intrusion, and that they reacted without making a positive identification of the aircraft. But there is no indication that the crew of KAL-007 was ever, or even could have been, aware of the Su-15 interceptor, let alone that KAL-007 took evasive action. On balance the evidence makes it seem far less likely that KAL-007 was serving any intelligence agency. Current Soviet Defense Debates and KAL-007 While the KAL-007 tragedy is now history, its reexamination is taking place during a period of debate concerning the role and fate of the Soviet air defense forces (the VPVO), and against a backdrop of improving Soviet--South Korean relations. Questions have already been raised in the Soviet press over the need for maintaining a separate air defense service, and the Izvestiya revelations do little to boost the image of the VPVO.45 Current military reform plans call for 18-20 percent cuts in VPVO personnel levels--the largest cut being planned for any of the military services.46 The new information on VPVO performance in 1983 may therefore play a role in the upcoming debate on military reform, perhaps significantly weakening the VPVO's claim to remain a separate service. The KAL-007 affair also has direct implications for the current Commander in Chief of the VPVO, General Ivan Tret'yak, a relatively conservative military officer. Tret'yak was commander of the Far East military district in 1983, and almost certainly played a role in the decision to shoot down KAL-007. His rise in the military, culminating in his appointment to the VPVO after the Rust incident, indicates that the KAL-007 affair did not harm his career. The new questions being raised might therefore reflect badly not only on the VPVO, but also directly on its Commander in Chief. That the Izvestiya revelations were unwelcome news for the military is also clear. The reports indicate a substantial disinformation campaign on the part of the senior Soviet military leadership of the time. This revelation may serve to further inflame tensions between the media and the military. In fact, the General Staff attempted to dissuade the reporters from publishing the series on KAL-007, and refused access to documents concerning the case.47 Finally, the series appears when Soviet--South Korean relations are warming rapidly, with the possibility of a visit by President Gorbachev to South Korea some time in the near future. A move to release more information about KAL-007, and perhaps even to accept blame and issue a formal apology, might play a significant role in improving relations between the two countries. Indeed, during South Korean President Roh's recent visit to the Soviet Union, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze reportedly expressed his "regret" over the shootdown. The South South Korean Foreign Minister reportedly accepted the comment as an apology.48 Given the sensitivity of the issue, and the ongoing debate over the future of Soviet strategic air defenses, it is unlikely that the last word on KAL-007 has been said.49 Izvestiya is also publishing a series based on research in the U.S., and other publications may try to get their own "scoops." In addition to the mystery of the black boxes there remain a number of unanswered questions on the Soviet side, particularly concerning the decisionmaking process within the VPVO. Answering these questions may finally clear up the aura of mystery surrounding the tragedy. NOTES 1 The ten part series is the result of investigative reporting by Izvestiya correspondent Andrey Illesh, published under the title "Tayna Koreyskogo "Boinga-747" in January 1991. Not all of the original Russian language articles were available to the author. Where possible, citations are to the Russian originals published in the Izvestiya Moscow evening edition. Other citations are based on the collected translation published in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report FBIS-SOV- 91-025 (February 6, 1991), pp. 3-27. An update to the series, based on new evidence, was published in FBIS-SOV-91-031-S, pp. 1-4. A later series written by Izvestiya's New York correspondent, investigating the U.S. side of the tragedy, is not covered in this report. 2 The most detailed, and plausible, account of the KAL-007 tragedy is "The Target is Destroyed" What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What America Knew About It (New York: Random House, 1986) by Seymour M. Hersh, a well-known investigative reporter. An earlier analysis that concentrates more on the internal Soviet decisionmaking process and background is Alexander Dallin, Black Box: KAL 007 and the Superpowers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). 3 For the official U.S. view see U.S. Information Agency, The Shootdown of KAL 007: Moscow's Charges--and the Record (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1983), and U.S. Department of State, KAL Flight #007: Compilation of Statements and Documents (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1983). 4 Reagan's remarks on the shootdown are reported in Kal Flight #007 p. 3. 5 The intelligence assessment indicating that the Soviets had not identified the aircraft wasn't released until January 1988, after action by Congressman Lee H. Hamilton. See Young and Launer, Flights of Fancy, p. 202. 6 The development of the Soviet version of events is critically examined in Young and Launer, Flights of Fancy, pp. 137-167. 7 The best-known conspiracy theories are those of R.W. Johnson, Shootdown: Flight 007 and the American Connection (New York: Viking, 1986) and David Pearson, KAL 007: The Cover-Up (New York: Summit, 1987). These conspiracy theories and the propaganda wars surrounding the KAL shootdown are incisively critiqued in Marilyn J. Young, Michael K. Launer, Flights of Fancy, Flight of Doom: KAL 007 and Soviet-American Rhetoric (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988). In adddition to analyzing the rhetoric, the Young and Launer introduce some new evidence and carefully dissect previously existing evidence. 8 Of particular note is the 1978 Soviet interception and attack on a KAL flight that strayed far off course and over the Kola peninsula. After much effort the target was intercepted, and despite clear identification of its civilian nature, was fired upon. The pilot managed to land the crippled aircraft, and even though the Soviets had the opportunity to inspect the aircraft, no evidence of espionage equipment was ever reported. See Hersh, The Target is Destroyed pp. 3-15. Other incidents are described in James E. Oberg, Uncovering Soviet Disasters (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 32-49. There have also been claims that Soviet civilian airliners have also been shot down by Soviet air defenses in cases of mistaken identity. For a Soviet account of an intercept and near attack on a Soviet civilian transport aircraft see V. Lavrinenkov, Bez voyny (Kiev: Politizdat, 1982) pp. 215-217. In the wake of the Rust flight, the VPVO revealed more information on attacks on intruding aircraft, see "Bditel'nost i reshitel'nost'--Chest' i doblest' voyna PVO," Vestnik PVO No. 8, 1987, pp. 3-6. 9 The Su-15 pilot reports that he flew more than 1000 intercepts over a ten year period, see Izvestiya January 23, 1991 p. 5. VPVO concerns over near incursions are reported in A. Galunov, "V zone--strategicheskiy razvedchik," Krasnaya zvezda September 10, 1988, p. 1; M. Lukyanin, A. Smolyanko, V. Strel'tsov, A. Ladin, V. Khabarov, "Lyudi i nebo," Krasnaya zvezda April 9, 1989, p. 1-2. For detailed information on U.S. reconnaissance flights in the Far East see Hersh, The Target is Destroyed pp. 35-43, 222-223. 10 Marshal Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff in 1983, ordered Izvestiya to misidentify the pilot responsible for shooting down KAL-007, and consequently most Western accounts refer to him as Major Vassiliy Kasmin. See Johnson, Shootdown p. 20 for an example. It does appear that a pilot by that name intercepted the KAL aircraft over Kamchatka, however, see FBIS-SOV-91-025, p. 6. 11 Izvestiya Jan. 23, 1991, p. 5; Hersh, The Target is Destroyed pp. 18-22. Zelenyy Island is part of the disputed Kurile chain (or Japanese Northern Territories). Hersh notes that it remains uncertain whether the overflight was intentional or not. 12 Soviet authorities were concerned over a possible repetition of the incident in which Viktor Belenko, a Soviet pilot, defected to Japan in his modern MiG-25 interceptor. Izvestiya January 23, 1991, p. 5. 13 FBIS-SOV-91-025, p. 6. 14 Izvestiya January 23, 1991, p. 5. The local time on Sakhalin is 9 hours different from Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) and 3 hours different from Japanese Summer Time (i.e. 3:00 am in Japan is the same as 6:00 am on Sakhalin). Hersh uses Japan time, while other sources use GMT. For a convenient summary see Dallin, Black Box p. 1. 15 This contradicts some accounts of VPVO operations that night. For example, Hersh, The Target is Destroyed p. 218, suggests that the VPVO forces on Kamchatka may have kept information concerning the overflight quiet, perhaps to prevent criticism for not stopping it. 16 Izvestiya January 23, p. 5. Rivet Joint missions were RC- 135 missions flown over the Sea of Okhotsk and other areas in order to monitor Soviet communications and air defense radars. See Hersh, The Target is Destroyed pp. 8-11, 220. 17 One difference between the transcript compiled by the U.S. and that published in Izvestiya is significant. In the U.S. transcript, Osipovich is reported as commenting at 1819:08 (6:19:08 local time) after the initial intercept that "They [KAL-007] do not see me." Dallin Black Box p. 24. The Izvestiya report (January 23, 1991, p. 5) gives this as "vremya ne vyydet" or "time is short." No explanation is given for this change, or mistranslation, from the English. This statement comes before Osipovich made his attempt to signal the aircraft, so it would be wrong to construe it as indicating that Osipovich believed he wasn't observed at any time during the intercept. The transcript is reproduced in Dallin, Black Box pp. 22-25. 18 Izvestiya January 23, 1991, p. 5. 19 Izvestiya January 24, 1991, p. 7. 20 This seems to be the period from 1815 GMT to perhaps 1820. Dallin, Black Box pp. 23-24. 21 This seems to be around 1820 GMT, judging from the transcript. Dallin, Black Box p. 24. This account seems to confirm that given in Hersh, The Target is Destroyed p. 233. 22 See the summary in Young and Launer, Flights of Fancy pp. 152-164. 23 Izvestiya January 24, 1991, p. 7. 24 On Osipovich's claim see Izvestiya January 24, 1991, p. 7. It is possible that the crew might have been preoccupied with work inside the cockpit. On the difficulty involved in getting a pilot's attention, even with tracers, see Hersh, The Target is Destroyed p. 233-234. Hersh also notes that the pilot (or co- pilot) may well have been absent from the cockpit at the time the Su-15 tried to signal the aircraft. See Ibid, pp. 205-208. 25 See Hersh, The Target is Destroyed p. 234. 26 Izvestiya January 24, 1991, p. 7. Osipovich's claim that Soviet pilots were not familiar with foreign civilian aircraft is amazing. The Boeing 747 is a distinctive design, and had been prominent in the aviation industry for over a decade. That Soviet pilots were ignorant of the Boeing 747 indicates very tight constraints on their training. The comparison to a Tu-16 bomber is also puzzling, for the Tu-16 is much smaller than either an Ilyushin 76 or a Boeing 747, and has quite a different configuration. Clearly, there was some confusion as to what kind of aircraft was being intercepted. Dallin, Black Box pp. 62-63, notes the difficulty in distinguishing between aircraft in the darkness at that range. 27 Izvestiya January 24, 1991, p. 7. After the missiles hit the air navigation lights went out, presumably because of a power failure. This confirms Hersh, The Target is Destroyed p. 235. 28 Hersh, The Target is Destroyed p. 232. 29 Hersh, The Target is Destroyed pp. 12-14. 30 Other articles have hinted at VPVO authority to open fire with surface-to-air missiles without any attempt to intercept intruders first. A. Galunov, "V zone--strategicheskiy razvedchik," Krasnaya zvezda September 10, 1988, p. 1. 31 Izvestiya January 25, 1991, p. 6. 32 FBIS-SOV-91-025, p. 26. The initial Izvestiya account was later confirmed by a naval officer in a follow-up article. see FBIS-SOV-91-031-S (February 14, 1991) p. 3-4. 33 Izvestiya January 25,p. 6; FBIS-SOV-91-025, p. 15, 18. 34 FBIS-SOV-91-025, p. 19. 35 Izvestiya January 29, 1991, p. 8; January 30, 1991, p. 5. 36 Izvestiya January 30, 1991, p. 5. The Izvestiya series claims that 3 black boxes were found, even though only 2 were on board the aircraft. See Izvestiya January 31, 1991, p. 7. 37 Izvestiya January 30, p. 5. 38 Peason's book is examined and critiqued in Young and Launer, Flights of Fancy, while Johnson's Shootdown is reviewed in Marilyn J. Young and Michael K. Launer, "007--Conspiracy or Accident?" Commonweal pp. September 12 1986, pp. 472-473. One example of a clear error by Johnson is his assertion that the fuselage of KAL-007 could not have been hit by a Soviet air to air missile because it would have caused a large hole and "all the passengers and crew would have been irresistably sucked out and flung into the freezing blackness." (pp. 27-28) There have been recent cases of substantial damage to fuselages resulting in rapid decompression, without having "all" the passengers and crew sucked out. Furthermore, this groundless assertion is belied by Osipovich's account. 39 Pearson's attempts at reinterpreting the transcript of the shootdown are demolished in Young and Launer, Flights of Fancy, pp. 83-96. 40 See Johnson, Shootdown pp. 19-28; David Pearson "K.A.L. 007 What the U.S. Knew And When We Knew It," The Nation August 18- 25, 1984, pp. 118-119. 41 Johnson, Shootdown p. 21, 27-28. 42 See, for example, Johnson, Shootdown pp. 200-207. 43 Refuting such an argument is extremely difficult, for new layers of conspiracy may always be added. Furthermore, it is easier to raise doubts about the facts than to answer them. 44 Hersh, in The Target is Destroyed gives perhaps the most convincing scenario for accidental deviation from the flightpath. 45 This debate was triggered by Aleksey Arbatov, "Skol'ko oborony dostatochno?" Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn' No. 3, 1989, pp. 41-43. The initial VPVO response is Yu. Lyubimov, "O dostatochnosti oborony i nedostatke kompetentnosti," Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil No. 16, 1990, pp. 21-26. 46 "Kontseptsiya voyennoy reformy," Pravitel'stvenniy Vestnik p. 7. 47 Izvestiya January 31, 1990, p. 7. 48 Far Eastern Economic Review December 27, 1990, p. 6. Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev repeated this comment during a visit to South Korea in January. See Report on the USSR January 18, 1991, p. 34. For a review of improving Soviet--South Korean relations see The Economist December 22, 1990, pp. 39-41. 49 As this article was being prepared for publication the Air Defense Forces replied to the Izvestiya series with four articles covering the KAL 1978 incident, KAL-007, and the Rust affair, along with some lesser known intrusions into Soviet airspace. These cases are compared to the destruction of an Iranian airbus by the U.S.S. Vincennes. (See A. Dokuchayev, "O 'Boingakh', 'Tsessne', i drugikh," Krasnaya zvezda March 13, 1991, p. 2; March 14, 1991, p. 2; March 15, 1991, p. 2; March 20, 1991, p. .), The series sheds little new light on the KAL- 007 incident, although it emphasizes that U.S. air activity in the Far East in 1983 was "terrorizing" the Air Defense Forces and raising tensions. The series plays up the Air Defense Force's professionalism and expertise in the very difficult task of intercepting and identifying intruding aircraft.